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The Human Capital Hoax: Work, Debt and Insecurity in the Era of Uberization       
 
Abstract 
 
Human capital theory - developed by neoclassical economists like Gary Becker and Theodore 
Schultz – is widely considered a useful way to explain how employees might enhance their 
value in organizations, leading to improved skill, autonomy and socio-economic wellbeing. 
This essay argues the opposite. Human capital theory implies that employees should bear the 
costs (and benefits) of their investment. Highly individualized training and work practices are 
an inevitable corollary. Self-employment, portfolio careers, the ‘gig economy’ and on-
demand business models (including Uber and Deliveroo) faithfully reflect the assumptions 
that inform human capital theory. I term this the radical responsibilization of the workforce 
and link it to growing economic insecurity, low productivity, diminished autonomy and 
worrying levels of personal debt. The essay concludes by proposing some possible solutions.        
 
KEY WORDS: human capital theory, personal debt; resistance; self-employment, skill, 
tertiary education, Uberization, zero-hour contracts  
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Introduction 
A well-known European budget airline recently made headlines when it was reported 
that almost 70 percent of its pilots were self-employed. In countries like the United Kingdom 
and US, the number of people classifying themselves as self-employed is rapidly growing 
(Office for National Statistics, 2014; Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2014). Politicians and 
neoclassical economists generally celebrate the trend. For the first time in the history of 
capitalism, workers can now reap the full benefits of their own labour. People no longer toil 
for someone else, but are their own bosses, deciding alone when and how to do their jobs. 
Individuals are able to enhance their own ‘human capital’ and enjoy the revenues it accrues. 
What some commentators call ‘free agents’ (Pink, 2002) and the ‘creative class’ (Florida, 
2012) are no longer alienated from the means of production like past generations. Instead 
they own their skill-set and call the shots on how they are used (Johns and Gratton, 2013). 
We are told, in fact, that this boost in occupational autonomy represents a major leap forward 
in workplace freedoms (Miller and Miller, 2012), perhaps heralding a new era of ‘frictionless 
capitalism’ and an end to industrial discontent (Stewart, 2013).  
But it was not due to these glowing endorsements of self-employment that the story 
met with widespread public interest. No, these pilots were in revolt. From their perspective, 
this was no positive development but an exploitative extension of economic rationalization. 
Now deemed self-employed, the pilots alone must bear the costs of uniforms, stopover hotels, 
identity cards and other expenses. They signed an exclusivity clause, promising not to fly 
with any other airline. Nor were they eligible for medical insurance or company pensions like 
normal employees. It was all beginning to look like a very bad deal. 
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The pilots protested that the system ultimately meant they were forced to fly since 
they would not be paid otherwise, even if unwell or fatigued. So they collectively drafted a 
‘safety petition’, arguing that the status of self-employment and the use of ‘zero-hours 
contracts’ (where workers are paid only for the hours they put in but guaranteed none in the 
advent of low demand) jeopardizes passenger safety. The response from airline management 
was blunt: “any pilot who participates in this so-called safety petition will be guilty of gross 
misconduct and will be liable for dismissal.”  
These pilots are experiencing a trend that has transformed many jobs over the last 
fifteen years in Western economies. Employment is being fundamentally individualized so 
that the costs of labour (that firms once covered) are pushed onto the employee with the help 
of labour-on-demand business models, self-employment, portfolio careers and zero-hours 
contracts. So pervasive are these shifts that some claim work is being ‘Uberized’ (2015), 
named after the company that has transformed the taxi industry along similar lines. And as 
the airline example illustrates, the suggestion that this liberates employees ought to be viewed 
with some scepticism, especially in light of the extra-long hours, economic insecurity and 
disempowerment that may ensue.  
There are many forces behind this ongoing individualization of the labour force, 
including the growing power of big business, the decline of unions and even the genuine 
desire for freedom among the workers. In this essay, I want to argue that one significant 
ideological precipitator can be found in a variant of neoclassical economics called human 
capital theory. The idea goes back to Adam Smith when he discussed how ‘useful abilities 
and talents’ are acquired by company workers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s a small 
group of economists began to formalize their own version of human capital theory. Jacob 
Mincer (1958), Theodore Schultz (1961), Gary Becker (1962, 1964) and later on, Robert E. 
Lucas (1988) applied the principles of neoclassical economics to individual behaviour, 
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proposing that people shouldn’t be considered citizens, students, patients or employees, for 
example. Instead they’re human capital, a social classification that transcends all others. 
Human capital(ists) are competitive individualists, preoccupied with investing and enhancing 
in their own economic value. From this point of view, life itself is a personal and permanent 
commercial project that requires business ambition to generate future income and avoid 
losses. According to Gary Becker (2008), we often assume that capital only refers to things 
like Apple stock, plant and banks accounts. However,  
 
…such tangible forms of capital are not the only type of capital. Schooling, a 
computer training course, expenditures on medical care, and lectures on the virtues of 
punctuality and honesty are also capital. That is because they raise earnings, improve 
health, or add to a person’s good habits over much of his lifetime. Therefore, 
economists regard expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on as 
investments in human capital. They are called human capital because people cannot 
be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way they can be 
separated from their financial and physical assets (Becker, 2008). 
Exactly who pays for the expenditure is central to the analysis that follows. And the 
idea that someone cannot be separated from this type of capital will be important too. 
Regardless, along with its scholarly proponents, human capital is today described by 
business, governments and even the United Nations as an unalloyed good. For if the concept 
implies investing in people, leading to more educated, heathier and wealthier employees and 
economies, then how could anyone be against it?  
In this essay I will argue that human capital theory has a dark side. From the 1990s 
onwards this once arcane framework has become central for enabling the individualization of 
the workforce, including the rise of zero-hours contracts and precarious employment 
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structures. This has resulted in what I term the radical responsibilization of employment, 
whereby responsibility for all the costs and benefits associated with being an economic actor 
are solely his or hers. I call it radical because it’s based upon an extreme version of self-
interested individualism, one that is largely unrealistic and unstainable in practice. For this 
reason, human capital theory might be something of a hoax. Employees don’t necessarily 
become wealthier, smarter or enjoy more self-determination by following its precepts. For 
sure, I aim to demonstrate a significant link between the tenets of human capital theory and 
the proliferation of economic insecurity, low-skilled work and personal debt that pervades 
many societies today. 
This is clearly bad for individual employees. But I plan to go one step further in the 
analysis and evaluate the effects on organizations and the wider economy. In societies that 
have embraced human capital theory we can observe how many commercial activities that it 
is supposed to enhance (e.g., skills investment, innovation, productivity, etc.) are actually 
hindered by it. The UK, for example, has seen within the space of a few years a relatively 
skilled (but unionized) workforce converted into an army of isolated agency workers and 
Deliveroo bicyclists delivering pizzas. Low productivity jobs have noticeably boomed (for 
example, see Booth, 2016; Resolution Foundation, 2016a). With respect to education and 
training in particular, human capital theory has played its part in ‘dumbing down’ 
organizations and economies where its influence is evident, not upskill them. 
After unpacking this argument, the essay then turns to some solutions. Is it possible to 
resist the degrading effects on jobs and organizations that has been hastened, in part at least, 
by the adoption of neoclassical concepts such as human capital theory?    
 
From the Working Class to Corporate Clans 
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To understand how human capital has helped facilitate the growing individualization 
of work, it is important to put the trend in historical perspective. By doing so we can clearly 
observe the steady atomization of the employee, which reaches its apogee in firms like 
Deliveroo, Uber and many others. 
 
Workers as the Embodiment of Class Interests 
The rise of industrial capitalism saw the birth of a very different way of working. 
Factory owners needed to officially demarcate the time/space of work since control in the 
factory, and later the administrative bureaucracy, was crucial to the productive process 
(Marx, 1867/1976; Weber, 1946). The separation of work and life was not easy, however, 
attracting a good deal of antipathy from the newly formed working classes (Thompson, 1963; 
Sellers, 1991). They were accustomed to directing the labour process themselves, usually out 
of necessity more than anything else. Now they found themselves in an austere, regulated 
space for 17 hours a day, with little say over how a job was performed.  
The ensuing battle between workers and employers over job autonomy deeply shaped 
management thought (Montgomery, 1989; Edwards, 1979). It was assumed that only 
scientifically trained managers ought to design the labour process (Nelson, 1974), with 
Fredrick Winslow Taylor most famously legitimating this stance. But in the factories of 
North America he was shocked by the degree of control and knowledge average workers had 
over their jobs. For him, this meant they had the upper hand. And that independence, he 
suspected, would be used for ‘irresponsible’ purposes; namely, against the interests of the 
company and for the interests of workers and their representatives, what Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999) label ‘irresponsible autonomy’: “in nineteen out of twenty industrial 
establishments the workers believe it to be directly against their interests to give their 
employers their best initiative … they deliberately work as slowly as they dare while at the 
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same time try to make those over them believe that they are working fast” (Taylor, 
1911/1967: 33). Taylor’s mission was clear. Worker control on the shopfloor had to be 
stamped out. This was achieved in a number of ways, including the introduction of piece rate 
incentive systems that “individualize each workman” (Taylor, 1911/1967:70).  
 
Workers as the Embodiment of Company Interests 
The severe dysfunctions of Taylorism were known for some time, with the Hawthorne 
Experiments, the neo-Human relations movement and more humane management approaches 
decrying the lack of involvement among the workforce. Under Taylorism employees had 
been ordered not to think and simply do as they were told. But when given discretion over 
their roles, a happier and more creative climate emerged. This impacted on the bottom line 
and meant less strikes. Under the intellectual direction of McGregor (1967) and Likert (1967) 
inter alia , employers were encouraged to foster ‘responsible autonomy’ in the workplace 
(Friedman, 1977). Given the broad economic objectives of a department or division, teams 
were allowed a degree of freedom over how to meet their targets. Rewards reflected this shift 
too, since only the best teams ought to be recognized for their initiative, commitment and 
resourcefulness.  
Responsible autonomy reorganized the collective spirit, but unlike its ‘irresponsible’ 
predecessor, it was enacted in the name of the company’s best interests rather than those 
associated with class or unions. The idea perhaps reached its pinnacle with the rise of 
corporate cultures in the 1980s and 1990s, based on Japanese motivation techniques and 
company pride (see Ouchi, 1980; Deal and Key, 1982; Barley and Kunda, 1993). The 
rationale was simple: teams will strive for excellence, do what’s best for the firm, stay late to 
get the job done and aim for ‘excellence’ if they fell in love with the company (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982). An array of indoctrination techniques were used to foster this emotional 
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bond between employees and employers (see Kunda, 1992). No wonder some compared them 
to the brainwashing methods used by cults (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996).  
 
While the management of corporate cultures is still popular, I suggest another 
significant transformation has occurred over the last 20 years in Western management 
thought. The change was, in part at least, prompted by the dysfunctions that ‘strong’ 
corporate cultures caused and firm-level attempts to overcome them (Fleming and Sturdy, 
2011). For example, studies revealed that many employees were secretly cynical about the 
idea of loving their firm, with one researcher reporting how employees called the company 
newsletter ‘Goebbels Gazette’ (Collinson, 1992). The situation was not helped by the wave of 
layoffs in the late 1980s. The so-called ‘IBM family’, for instance, turned out to be not so 
nurturing after all (Berger, 1993). Moreover, the sheer cost of building and maintaining a 
corporate culture was yet another disincentive for employers (e.g., see Bains, 2007).  
Other permutations were afoot that probably also curtailed the corporate culture fad. 
The massive emphasis on shared identification meant some employees were more concerned 
with fitting in and looking the part (Casey, 1995). Innovation, entrepreneurship and 
productive risk-taking are stifled under such conditions (Foster and Kaplan, 2001). Changing 
demographics in the workforce too saw an appetite for authenticity and personal difference 
rather than pretending to approximate a cardboard cut-out version of the ‘corporate (wo)man’ 
(Ross, 2004). For a new generation of workers and managers, one’s individuality outside the 
office mattered (Janssens and Zanoni, 2005; Raeburn, 2004). Moreover, its authentic 
expression in the workplace might be beneficial to morale and productivity since workers 
could be themselves and excel in their own way.   
Enter Human Capital Theory 
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The decline of the corporate culture movement needs to be placed in historical context 
to fully grasp the implications. From the late 1990s onwards, work has been extensively 
reorganized in mainly Anglo-Saxon countries but also elsewhere. This has included the 
decline of unions and increasingly restrictive laws around industrial action (Richards, 2010; 
International Labour Organization, 2016); the deregulation of the labour market and the end 
of secure, lifelong jobs; the emergence of the so-called ‘gig economy’ (Hook, 2015; 
Sundararajan, 2015) and casual or freelance work (Rashid, 2016); the polarization between 
high and low skilled occupations (Kalleberg, 2013) and so-forth.  
‘Flexibility’ is perhaps the most common term to describe employment today. The 
average worker no longer defines themselves in relation to shared class interests, nor 
collective love for a long-term employer. As Boudreau and Ramstad (2007) point out, a 
human capital approach takes us far beyond corporate clans and its emphasis on unity since 
workers behave in a much more individualistic manner, almost as a mini-corporation in their 
own right, viewing themselves as peripatetic agents in a competitive marketplace. Given how 
market rationalization has transformed employment law and regulation, perhaps it is the 
individual contract, rather than class or company culture, which matters the most to the new 
worker.  
Multiple drivers have been identified behind these shifts in countries like the US, UK, 
New Zealand and increasingly continental Europe and Scandinavia, including the 
consolidation of corporate power, neoliberal state policy, the off-shoring of relatively well-
paid manufacturing jobs to the Global South and the evolving, intrinsic requirements of work 
in the service and IT sector (see Mason, 2015; Hill, 2014). However, I argue that the growing 
individualizing of employment has been significantly enabled by an important intellectual 
movement associated with neoclassical economics, human capital theory, which has had a 
major influence on policy makers, governments and other powerful decision-makers. As 
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mentioned earlier, the notion was formally developed by Jacob Mincer (1958), Theodore 
Schultz (1961) and Gary Becker (1962, 1964) among others, suggesting that individuals (i.e., 
their stock of skills, knowledge, education and even personal attributes) could also be 
conceptualized as capital along with equipment, equity, etc.  
The notion of human capital might sound relatively benign (if somewhat materialistic) 
at first. But it has a dark side. I propose that it helped reimagine employees as competitive, 
self-interested agents that are somehow external to the firm, rather than an internal core 
resource that requires company investment, training and stewardship. And this has had some 
very negative consequences.       
 
Is Human Capital a Public or Private Good? 
One of the first economists to theorize human capital warned his audience at the 
American Economic Association meeting in 1960 that treating living human beings as 
“property or marketable assets” might seem distasteful to the average person (Schultz, 1961: 
2). The trick is to emphasize the importance of owning one’s individual prospects, the 
freedom granting powers of self-investment and its impact on wider prosperity. Gary Becker 
(1962a) extended the argument in his discussion of employee training, dividing human 
capital into two types. Specific human capital are skills highly particular to a job and non-
transferable to other firms. Whereas general human capital are abilities that can be used in 
different organizations or/and industries and are unbound to any particular site of production. 
Becker then asks an important question. When human capital is transferable (or general) as it 
increasingly is, who should pay for its development? Probably not employers since that kind 
of investment might one day literally walk out the door or be poached by a rival. In 
competitive markets, “firms would provide general training only if they did not have to pay 
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any of the costs … hence the costs as well as the return from general training would be borne 
by trainees, not by firms” (Becker, 1962a: 13).    
Schultz’s address to the American Economic Association reluctantly comes to similar 
conclusions about education. Once a student is reconfigured as human capital, it stands to 
reason that the initial investment ought to be made by them alone since they are the primary 
beneficiaries. One can easily detect Schultz hesitate on this point since he’s evidently a fan of 
public education, understanding its importance for national economic wellbeing. The 
prevarication ends, however, when a colleague asks for clarification: “Should the returns 
from public investment in human capital accrue to the individuals whom it is made?” 
(Schultz, 1961: 15). He wants to say yes because state investment in a collective (yet 
privately articulated) utility such as tertiary education, for example, can stimulate the wider 
economy as public goods often do. But he falters under the weight of the question, perhaps 
detecting in it a taste of things come:  
 
The policy issues implicit in this question run deep and are full of perplexities 
pertaining to both resource allocation and to welfare. Physical capital that is formed 
by public investment is not transferred as a rule to particular individuals as a gift. It 
would greatly simplify the allocative processes if public investment in human capital 
were placed on the same footing (Schultz, 1961: 15).  
 
The reply is ambivalent and includes two possible conclusions: 1). returns on human 
capital derived from public investment (e.g., taxes) ought to remain in public hands or 2). 
returns on human capital derived from public investment (e.g., taxes) cannot be a ‘gift’ if 
organized along the same principles as any other private enterprise, in which the beneficiary 
naturally bears some or all of the investment costs.   
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The first option is state communism and logically anathema to the very idea of human 
capital since it can only be owned by the individual who embodies it. As we have learnt, 
human capital and its living carrier can never be separated. The implication is clear. Nobody 
else can own my human capital because that would be slavery, which conclusively rules out it 
being linked to ‘welfare’ programmes run by the state.   
 
So only the second option remains tenable. Schultz cannot have what he really wants. 
His cake (i.e., skill acquisition as a private, individual responsibility) and eat it too (public 
investment in everyone’s skills). We learn in a footnote the identity of the colleague who 
prompted Schultz to ask whether human capital is a private or public good; no other than 
Milton Friedman, a vociferous supporter for privatization in the Thatcher and Reagan years 
whose influence is still being felt today. From now on the underlying message of human 
capital theory is simple: there is no such thing as a free lunch.   
Friedman had found the ideological lure he was looking for because an individual’s 
human capital (including its earnings and liabilities) can be owned by nobody else. More 
importantly, human capital theory provides the ultimate neoclassical retort to the Marxist 
slogan that workers should seize the means of production. If each person is already their own 
means of production, then the intractable conflict at the heart of the capitalist labour process 
must logically dissolve. As it turns out, according to Schultz, all workers are in fact 
consummate capitalists: “labourers have become capitalists not from the diffusion of the 
ownership of corporation stocks, as folk law would have it, but from the acquisition of 
knowledge and skill that have economic value” (Schultz, 1961: 3).   
 
Human Capital Goes to Work 
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Given the basic premise of human capital theory forged in the early 1960s, we can 
easily observe how it smoothed the way for radical responsibilization: where each individual 
human capitalist becomes entirely responsible for his or her economic fate. By the 1990s 
human capital theory had found a wide audience, especially in the business world (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 1994; Davenport, 1999). Viewing employees as individual mini-enterprises was 
soon all the rage. Kunda and Ailon-Souday (2005) note how HRM practitioners largely 
abandoned reference to clans, family and culture, all of which connote collectivist values. 
Instead they adopted a market rationalist perspective when considering the firm’s relationship 
to its employees and vice versa. With concepts like the boundaryless and portfolio career 
moving to centre stage, Kunda and Ailon-Souday note how the metaphor of love and 
marriage suddenly seemed old-fashioned when describing contemporary organizations. By 
the beginning of the 21st century, short-term affairs and one nightstands better captured the 
climate, especially as the ideals of economic self-reliance and independence supplanted 
expectations of a long-term relationship with an employer.  
Following Peter Drucker’s (1993) pontifications about the coming ‘employee society’ 
the next most read proselytizer of this approach was Tom Peters and his notion of ‘liberation 
management’ (Peters, 1994). Retracting his 1980s obsession with strong organizational 
cultures, he now claimed that the workplace ought to be defined by personal difference and 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. The pursuit of individual self-interest creates way more 
shareholder value than any slavish adherence to a collective identity. This is why, according 
to Peters, it is best to treat employees as if they were their own micro-enterprises. 
Organizational members are encouraged to discover ‘The Brand Called You’ (Peters 2000). 
This intangible asset can be leveraged and capitalized upon at the crucial moment for those 
who understand both the external and internal job market. 
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This is certainly telling of a sea change in popular books about organizations, 
management and business. But how exactly does radical responsibilization playout in 
practice? It can do so in a several ways, I suggest. Freelancing, self-employment and agency 
work associated with on-demand contracts are obvious examples we have already discussed. 
But organizations might manage their permanent workforce along the same lines too. For 
example, Ressler and Thompson (2012) observe the rise of what they call ‘Results Only 
Work Environments’ (or ROWE) in a number of US industries. Rather than focus on 
productive inputs, as much management wisdom prescribes in relation to monitoring, training 
and motivation, ROWE firms are only concerned with outcomes. Once again the employee is 
somehow external to the organization, which is used to good effect. Academia partially 
follows this flexi-work model. My employer is largely unconcerned when, where and how I 
prepare for a Tuesday afternoon lecture, be it in the middle of the night or in the weekend. 
Indeed, it would be counter-productive to insist I check in at 9am on Monday morning and be 
at my desk present and accounted for. As long as I arrive to the lecture hall and do a 
satisfactory job (which, of course, is measured rather rigorously!) my employer is happy. 
Unlike managers of yesteryear, Ressler and Thompson (2012: 61) suggest, businesses don’t 
worry that ROWE workers are going to shirk their duties if nobody is watching them all day: 
“It’s not about giving people more time with the kids. ROWE is not about having more time 
off … you might even work more”. 
It is with the individualistic contract-based business model that we see human capital 
theory really come into its own. As mentioned earlier, such contractualization exemplifies the 
narrow manner in which human capital theory interprets self-interest. People are now 
monadic and self-contained enterprises rather than members of a wider group. For example, 
in Western economies there has been a boom in self-employment over the last ten years, with 
a staggering 14.6 million people registered in the US in 2015 (Pew Research Centre, 2015). 
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In the UK, the self-employed workforce has grown by 45% since 2001, standing at almost 
five million workers (Resolution Foundation, 2016b). Additionally, it is estimated that in 
2014 about 1.8 million ‘on call’ or ‘zero-hours’ contracts existed, a figure that probably 
underestimates the true extent of their presence in the hotel/restaurant, education and 
healthcare industries (Office for National Statistics, 2014). The so-called ‘gig economy’, 
whereby contractors continuously move from job to job like journeymen or a musician, is 
said to capture the future of work in OECD economies (Reich, 2015).  
 
Neoliberal ideology overwhelmingly supports these shifts in how work is organized, 
proclaiming the benefits for employers, workers and consumers. Echoing the tenets of human 
capital theory, this is all about empowering people. We now thankfully live in a ‘Free Agent 
Nation’ (Pink, 2001) where choice and preference are considered basic occupational 
attributes. Unlike our parents and grandparents who had no option but to conform to mass 
patterns of employment in and out of the office, actors today can tailor work around their 
lifestyle. This sentiment is best exemplified by Semco CEO Ricardo Semler (2007: 13): 
“imagine a company where workers set their own hours; where there are no offices … 
[where] you have the freedom to get your job done on your own terms and to blend your 
work life and personal life … smart bosses will eventually realize that you might be most 
productive of you work on Sunday afternoon, play golf on Monday morning …” 
 
The Poverty of Human Capital Theory 
In many ways, this economic individualization probably still echoes the appeal for 
autonomy that has informed so much employee dissatisfaction from the early industrial 
period onwards. Discretion over how, where and when a job is performed remains attractive 
to many today. Yet, as I have demonstrated, the basis upon which that independence is 
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defined has been systematically desocialized over time; from industry or even economy-level 
class interests, to a narrower set of company interests and then finally to individual self-
interest.  
Do these trends really yield the splendid benefits that human capital economists, 
management gurus and government officials so often imagine? I argue that the radical 
responsibilization of jobs has a nasty side, one that economically and politically 
disadvantages workers, and eventually hurts industry more generally. For many entering this 
new era of employment, financial insecurity, declining wages and less job autonomy is 
expected. In other words, the individualism promoted here creates vulnerabilities to the forces 
of concentrated economic power, particularly in economies that lionize privatization, limit 
state public spending and expose almost every facet of life to the marketplace. In this way, 
the politics of work is now closely interwoven with other social justice concerns related to 
‘life’ more generally like affordable housing, the cost of living crisis, personal debt and 
access to education. Let’s survey some of these negative outcomes in more detail.   
 
Lower Incomes and Work Intensification 
Employment relationships inspired by human capital theory are lucrative to individual 
workers if their skill is scarce and demand is high. In the majority of cases, however, 
contract-based independence generally has a downward pressure on income because of 
competition and the asymmetrical power relationship that develops between firms and 
workers (Trade Unions Congress, 2014). Why so? As dictated by the principles of 
neoclassical economics, when a person is reconceptualized as human capital, they become an 
external agent with their own set of interests. A mini-corporation. It’s only a small step to 
then conclude that they ought to be liable for meeting the financial overheads of that 
economic interest. The pilot example mentioned earlier is a good case in point. Individualized 
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liabilities include not only fringe benefits like medical insurance, training and pensions, but 
also basic equipment to get the job done: uniforms, ID cards, transport and other essentials 
that would render the labour process impossible if absent. 
Wages are also depreciated by the sporadic and unpredictable nature of such 
employment compared to standard jobs. Fluctuations in labour demand, coupled with a one-
sided power relationship that sees employers alone decide whether you will work and be paid 
today, for example, inevitably lowers income expectations. This is often backed up by state 
legislation. For example, basic employment law, including the National Minimum Wage does 
not apply to self-employed or independent contractors in the UK. Neither are they entitled to 
other benefits that normally apply. A government website lists these as:  
 
Statutory Sick Pay.  
Statutory maternity, paternity, adoption and shared parental leave. 
Minimum notice periods if their employment will be ending, eg if an employer is 
dismissing them. 
Protection against unfair dismissal. 
The right to request flexible working. 
Time off for emergencies. 
Statutory Redundancy Pay. 
A report in the England revealed the economic fate of many who are reclassified as 
self-employed. Most notably, the likelihood of ending up as the next Uber-rich Richard 
Branson is rather low: “Self-employed people on average have experienced a 22% fall in real 
pay since 2008-09, with average earnings of £207 a week, less than half that of employees, 
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with no sick pay or holiday pay, and no employer to contribute towards their pension” 
(Monagham, 2014: 25). According to another study, the burgeoning class of self-employed 
workers in England are paid in 2016 less than a typical employee in 1994 (Resolution 
Foundation, 2016b).    
A recent account of a courier driver working for Hermes in the Britain demonstrates 
how this pay-cut can occur. First of all was the training. The driver spent two days shadowing 
another contractor, which he wasn’t paid for, since as Gary Becker proposed, that would be 
economically irrational to the firm. Once the driver was on the payroll, he calculated his 
income to be about £4 per hour before expenses. And after figuring these expenses into the 
equation the bleak reality became clear:  
The Hermes model offloads all the risk on to the “independent” courier, but the 
potential reward is absolutely limited. You are responsible for the packages, any 
problems with the system, your car, paying for your holiday time, covering any 
sickness. I learned that the postman in one of the villages had recently had an 
operation on his hand as a result of an injury at work. His job was pretty much the 
same as mine, but he was a Royal Mail employee and had just had five weeks off on 
sick pay. Hermes couriers don’t get any sick pay. The postmen often help out the 
couriers because they feel sorry for them. They know the Hermes guys get a raw deal 
(quoted in Heywood, 2016).   
And therein lies another important facet of radical responsibilization. What employers 
consider cheap labour is actually very expensive for everybody else to maintain. For instance, 
a company would find it almost impossible to hire a restaurant worker on minimum (or 
below) wage without the state covering the shortfall with tax credits, housing benefits and so-
forth. This amounts to a generous public subsidy to corporations who are not willing to pay a 
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basic living wage. In 2012-13, the UK taxpayer gifted the corporate sector £93bn or about 
£3,500 from each household in direct and indirect subsidies (Chakrabortty, 2015). Moreover, 
a National Housing Federation (2016) study in the Britain found that housing benefits – paid 
to the working poor who cannot afford their rent – resulted in private landlords pocketing 
£9.3bn in 2015. Twice as much than in 2005. The cost to the US taxpayer for low paid work 
is even steeper (Good Jobs First, 2014). The conclusion is sobering. The application of 
human capital theory to the general workforce has arguably resulted in one of the most 
outlandish ‘corporate welfare’ programmes to ever emerge in Western societies.       
 
With sagging wages and rising insecurity, it is easy to see why the pressure to work – 
no matter what – is more apparent when the workforce is Uberized in this manner. For 
example, Gregg’s (2011) study of freelance workers in Australia highlights the long hours of 
work involved in order to make ends meet. Human capital theory is clearly influential here. 
From this perspective the enterprising individual is supposed to ignore the traditional 
boundaries that were once erected between work and non-work. For they are now ‘permanent 
enterprises’, a phrase coined by Michel Foucault (2010) in his lectures on neoliberalism, 
since life itself becomes a constant economic venture. Human capitalists can never ‘check 
out’ in this respect. If this means working all night to meet a deadline then so be it. Overwork 
and burnout are soon inevitable. 
In addition to overwork, another important consequence arises when employment is 
organized this way: unpaid work. Gregg (2011) found that when economy and life become 
one (the ultimate datum of human capital theory), people find themselves working on their 
own time, say on Sunday night in order to prepare for a Monday morning meeting. Work 
colonizes everything else since life as such (Gary Becker even includes our choice of 
romantic partner) is nothing but a set of commercial transactions. In the context of her study, 
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Gregg observed flexi-workers personally paying for what ought to have been a company 
expense, such as postage and software, in order to meet deadlines (also see Lambert, 2015; 
Bobo, 2009). We might term this ‘free work capitalism’. It affects not only freelancers but 
also many in stable jobs too as mobile technology makes it difficult to tell when the work day 
is truly over. It not surprising that a recent study by the Chartered Management Institute 
(2016) in the UK discovered many employees cancelling out their entire annual statutory 
holiday allowance given the after-hours work they do. Once again, burnout, hyper-tension 
and low productivity was cited as a clear consequence, according to the study.  
 
Debt and a Dumbed Down Economy 
The radical responsibilization of work outlined above is interconnected with other 
alarming developments that can easily be traced back to human capital theory. The early 
economists working in this area were preoccupied with training and education as a key self-
investment opportunity. Recall how Schultz (1961) argued that benefits derived from the 
public investment in human capital cannot be owned by a private individual. This is no gift or 
welfare programme. The corollary is that for the concept of human capital to hold water (i.e., 
individuals alone possessing their human capital since they cannot be separable from it), he 
or she must ultimately be responsible for the investment outlay. At the firm level, as Becker 
(1962) averred, it’s irrational for an employer to cover training costs because in a competitive 
labour market turnover is expected. At the state level, Friedman (1962) popularized a similar 
attitude. Why should hard working taxpayers ‘gift’ to a complete stranger the resources 
required to accumulate their human capital given that only the said stranger benefits from the 
investment?     
In the end, this means training and skill acquisition is largely the individual 
employee’s responsibility. The implication is clear. If someone seeks to enjoy the relative 
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advantages of being employed as a skilled employee, then tertiary education and or/training is 
essential. This is no public provision, however, since only the individual in question profits in 
terms of future earnings. To see the rationale is practice, just look at the language used in the 
1997 Dearing report that effectively ended free tertiary education in the UK. It has human 
capital theory written all over it: 
 
The level of investment needed in a learning society is such that we see a need for 
those who benefit from education and training after the age of 18 to bear a greater 
share of the costs. As a result, we expect students of all ages will be increasingly 
discriminating investors in higher education, looking for quality, convenience, and 
relevance to their needs at a cost they consider affordable and justified by the 
probable return on their investment of time and money (Dearing Report, 1997: 11). 
 
The terminology represents a major paradigm change in how the resourcing of tertiary 
education is understood, transforming what was once considered a ‘public good’ into a 
private investment. Unless they’re already wealthy, most people won’t have immediate 
access to the funds required for tuition fees. So personal debt becomes a solution. There is 
thus a clear connection between the reschematization of people as human capital (particularly 
in an inegalitarian society) and the tremendous rise of student indebtedness. Exacerbated by 
aggressive fiscal policy and a predatory finance industry (see Ross, 2014), student debt has 
become enormous in many OECD economies. In the US it stood at $1.2 trillion in 2014, with 
over 7 million debtors in default. In the UK the figure is about £2bn and steadily growing. A 
report in the UK found that the average 18-year old entering university today will still be 
making loan repayments well into their fifties (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2014).  
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A number of dysfunctions beset a society that finances the acquisition of knowledge 
and skills using unsafe levels of credit. Many members of the ‘jilted generation’ (Howker and 
Malik, 2010) are simply unwilling to take on such a life-long liability, especially in 
economically deprived neighbourhoods where the dream of a well-paid graduate job remains 
simply that, a dream. It doesn’t help that for the first time since tuition fees were introduced 
in the UK, for example, student debt repayments now cancel out most graduate ‘pay 
premiums’ or what is added to lifetime earnings by having a university degree rather than not 
(Intergenerational Foundation, 2016). When David Bowie recently died an astute 
commentator wondered if such ground-breaking talent could ever emerge in present day 
London given how the working-class Bowie enjoyed free art college, etc. With almost daily 
reports about the dreadful anxiety experienced by student creditors (e.g., Huffington Post, 
2013), whole generations have sort to keep the debt collector at bay by avoiding higher 
education altogether (Callender and Jackson, 2005). Was another Bowie among them? Who 
knows? But sadly we wouldn’t ask the same question regarding another Donald Trump.  
That’s the point. Skill and innovation are structurally compromised under these 
conditions of inequality because the potential pool of talent is so drastically shrunk. Only a 
small group of individuals from wealthy families end up with jobs that require expertise and 
attract high incomes. For everyone else, a self-reinforcing, downward spiral emerges. The 
sequence goes like this. Low-skilled job creation is inevitable in light of substandard labour 
market capabilities. This discourages capital investment and labour productivity therefore 
falls (Autor and Dorn, 2013; O’Connor, 2015). We can understand why an employer would 
not be overly enthusiastic about investing in new machinery or IT system if there is no labour 
force to make the most of it (Gordon, 2016; Broadbent, 2015). In the meantime, evolving at 
the other end of the labour market is a serious skills deficit. Limited training opportunities 
mean there aren’t enough qualified people to fill the available vacancies (see Gordon, 2012; 
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The Economist, 2015). Anti-immigration policies clearly exacerbate that problem. And so on. 
To summarise, economic growth seems to contract in economies that endorse human capital 
theory. The old prediction that post-industrial societies would produce an immense, upward 
‘skills revolution’ (Bell, 1974) almost seems comical today. 
 
More Management, Not Less 
Hence one of the more unexpected outcomes of radical responsibilization. We are told 
that human capitalists are ‘free agents’, alone determining how and when they work. But 
much of the evidence suggests that these workers are micro-managed, monitored and directly 
supervised more now than ever. The observation is missed by celebrants and critics alike, 
who emphasize self-management and self-regulation, albeit insecure, precarious and stressful. 
Even hardened critics of new capitalism like Andre Gorz (2010) wrongly assume that old 
fashion managerialism tends to disappear with the advent of individualized, market-based 
employment practices. People are assumed to manage themselves, anxiously micro-managing 
their lives from project to project. But here is the rub. Disenfranchised human capitalists are 
certainly on their own when it comes to absorbing the risks and costs of economic insecurity. 
But this doesn’t mean they are left alone. Just the opposite. Authoritarianism is now a 
definitive aspect of this approach to labour relations, even in the relatively well paid 
corporate sector, as the shocking expose of white-collar employment at Amazon recently 
revealed (Kantor and Streitfeld, 2015). 
Perhaps it is here that the promise of full autonomy pledged in the name of human 
capital is truly betrayed. In their extensive study of organizational-level employment 
practices, Kleinknecht, Kwee & Budyanto (2016) found that deregulated labour markets tend 
to have ‘thicker’ and more ridged management structures than normal workplaces: 
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“organisations employing high shares of flexible workers have higher shares of managers in 
their personnel. We argue that flexibility in labour markets (i.e. easier firing and higher 
labour turnover) damages trust, loyalty and commitment. This requires more management 
and control” (Kleinknecht et al., 2016: 1137). The management function – especially its 
policing aspect – returns with vengeance given the unhappiness that radical responsibilization 
fosters in the workforce, a trend predicted back in the mid-1990s by more prescient economic 
commentators (e.g., Gordon, 1996).  
Blend this hyper-distrust with technological surveillance and then some really 
worrying work patterns emerge, even in relatively skilled and secure occupations. For 
example, in January 2016 journalists at a well-known London newspaper were suddenly 
ordered to wear heat/motion sensors that monitored whether they were at their desks 
(Waterson, 2016). The initiative was introduced without notice. Employees simply found the 
devices at their work stations on Monday morning and Googled the brand name to identify 
what they were. An edict was later issued by senior management. The monitors must be worn 
at all times during work hours. For many it didn’t make sense. Journalism doesn’t operate 
this way. It flourishes when workers can rove from their desk, not when needlessly tied to it. 
But perhaps the issue was no longer about productivity. Management distrust had clearly 
become self-defeating. Superiors were willing to risk obstructing the very labour process they 
ostensibly sought to optimize rather than lose control. This is how the insecurity caused by 
radical responsibilization can fuel a vicious cycle. More disgruntlement leads to even more 
intrusive controls and so on.        
 
Resisting the Human Capital Hoax 
I have aimed to demonstrate how human capital theory provides an ideological alibi 
for the radical responsibilization of the workforce. Developed by neoclassical economists like 
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Gary Becker, Theodore Schultz and Milton Friedman, human capital theory fundamentally 
individualizes people, placing the costs of economic activity onto the employee. Self-
employment, on-demand business models, freelancing and what some term the Uberization 
of the workforce effortlessly follow from the idea that people are ultimately responsible for 
their own economic fate. Human capital theory is widely celebrated as a framework for 
explaining how organizations and societies can build skill, innovation and economic security. 
I have argued, however, that it can result in the opposite. Instead of being freer and wealthier, 
human capitalists are just as likely to be mired in debt, insecure and dominated by 
authoritarian management systems.  
Of course, not everything wrong with contemporary employment should be blamed 
on human capital theory. But given how it is continuously discussed in such positive terms, 
this essay has sort to highlight the negative side of human capital theory, especially the 
employment practices that have been so patently inspired by it.    
Is it possible to resist or even reverse the organizational trends this essay has 
identified? An important first step is to demonstrate how the radical responsibilization of 
work isn’t a more effective and efficient form of economic rationality. On many levels it is 
economically irrational. Zero-hours contracts, Uberization and low skilled jobs are tiringly 
expensive to the state and individual workers alike, damaging labour productivity and 
economic growth. Employee well-being undeniably declines because of poorer pay, onerous 
management structures and lack of investment in training. Neoliberal discourse attempts to 
cloak these dysfunctions by emphasizing individual choice and responsibility once again. If 
you’re a loser in the new world of work it must somehow be your fault. Human capital theory 
perfects this maxim.  
While this essay has emphasized the ideological import of human capital theory, 
many of the adverse trends discussed above are now thoroughly societal, resulting from the 
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way work is structurally organized. The most obvious conclusion from my analysis is that 
workers today have been grossly disempowered by these emergent employment relationships. 
This has allowed the genuine yearning for worker independence to be hijacked and 
transformed into an instrument of proletarianization. Rebalancing the employer/employee 
relationship is the only way the situation might be rectified. This means employee 
collectivization, breaking the spell of human capital theory and its impoverishing brand of 
individualism. But is this realistically possible?  
In many ways it is already happening, with labour collectives around the world 
opposing the human capital hoax. For example, London Uber drivers took their case to the 
UK Employment Tribunal in October 2016. They claimed they were employees (rather than 
self-employed) and thus eligible to be paid the minimum wage. The court agreed (Osbourne, 
2016). Other examples of collective action against radical responsibilization include the ‘alt-
labour’ movement in the US (Eidelson, 2013), employee cooperatives in Europe (such as the 
inter-European CECOP network) and the recent global trend of employee activism (Weber 
Shandwick, 2015). For sure, recall how the disgruntled pilots mentioned at the beginning of 
this essay formed a concertive response to their de facto employer.  
The return to solidarity does not necessarily have to be in the name of class interests, 
which has significantly diminished as an ‘imagined community’ in recent years. Perhaps 
championing the broader idea of universal workers’ rights is a more effective strategy, 
potentially reaching a richer audience than any appeal to increasingly fragile class loyalties. 
Regardless, a more balanced employment relationship is indispensable if self-determination 
is to be successfully renegotiated to create fairer life chances. No doubt this may have a 
positive impact on the economy more generally (in terms of engagement, productivity, less 
cumbersome management, higher wages that drive growth, etc.). Only on these grounds can 
the desire for independence be practically achieved. The point needs emphasizing, which also 
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highlights the flimsy foundations upon which human capital theory is built. One cannot truly 
express individualism, self-reliance and choice when desperately dependent on an unequal 
power relationship. Wider societal backup and support is necessary. 
Governmental policy must play a decisive role in promoting a more just organization 
of work. Many Anglo-Saxon nation-states have been openly hostile to the collective 
empowerment of workers. When the workforce has meaningful input into their occupations, 
disengagement will no longer be the overriding experience. Democratizing the workplace 
requires legal support and incentives, which the state can readily deliver (for example, the 
New Zealand government recently out-lawed zero-hours contracts after much pressure from 
trade unions [see Roy, 2016]). Other measures are also possible. A universal living wage 
would effectively neutralize the existential fear that has led so many to settle for so little in 
contemporary organizations. Detractors wrongly argue that society cannot afford such 
spending and inflation would run rampant. However, given the genuine independence that a 
universal living wage permits, the bill is typically less compared to funding the vast 
infrastructure needed to organize the unemployed and working poor (Bregman, 2016). 
Inflation doesn’t rise because no new money is printed, only more equally distributed. And 
the presumption that businesses must automatically shift the expense of fairer wages onto the 
consumer (via the hiked prices of goods and services) was always dubious economic 
reasoning (see Stout, 2012).  
An important basis of occupational empowerment is skill. However, as I have tried to 
explain in this essay, major organizational and economic dysfunctions emerge when skill is 
treated simply as a private good. It instead ought to be framed as a public one: embodied in 
specific individuals, work groups and organizations, but if enhanced will substantially 
contribute to broader prosperity in an egalitarian economy. We can already see this ethos 
fermenting in counter-business initiatives related to the creative commons and co-operatives. 
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These organizations grow precisely by sharing knowhow rather than privatizing and hording 
it. While the much vaunted notion of the ‘sharing economy’ has partially fallen prey to 
corporate interests (see Slee, 2015), it has helped spark debates about how value might be 
generated outside the doxa of private property and competitive individualism (see Mason, 
2015).  
Once knowledge and skill are deemed a public concern, we must inevitably abandon 
human capital theory because it is intrinsically wedded to the axiom of private, individual 
ownership. Robert E. Lucas’ (1988: 36) interesting attempt to square the circle in the human 
capital paradigm only concluded that there must be some external and unobservable force 
that adds value beyond the individual human capitalist, a mysterious “factor X” that prevents 
“cities flying apart”. Isn’t this telling of the wilful blindness of neoclassical economics? A 
Nobel Prize laureate feels more comfortable using the term ‘factor X’ than the ‘common 
good’.             
De-privatizing the skills pool would mean radically rethinking the provision of higher 
education and training (also see Lazzarato, 2012; Harney and Moten, 2013). In particular, 
reversing the massive dependence on student debt that has disfigured many Anglo-Saxon 
economies today is crucial if the skills base is to be rejuvenated and innovation cultivated. 
The debt refusal movement is gaining traction in this regard and holds hope for 
conceptualizing education outside the human capital agenda. For example, Simon Crowther 
gained notoriety in March 2016 when he sent a letter to his local Minister of Parliament 
complaining that there was something deeply flawed with the student loans system. He 
simultaneously posted the letter online and received much media attention. His initial debt 
was a modest sum, but it had somehow ballooned into £41,976 by 2016 because he was 
paying £180 a month in interest payments. As Crowther’s letter of protest points out, he and 
fellow students,  
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… feel we have been cheated by a government who encouraged many of us to 
undertake higher education, despite trebling the cost of attending university. I was still 
in sixth form at school when I agreed to the student loan. I had no experience of loans, 
credit cards or mortgages. Like all the other thousands of students in the UK, we 
trusted the government that the interest rate would remain low – at around 0%-0.5% 
(cited in Osbourne, 2016b). 
Given the indenture-like nightmare that personal debt entails, the debt refusal 
movement is an important first step towards a more humane socio-economic system (see 
Ross, 2014). Similarly, governments must seriously consider debt forgiveness if we are to 
dismantle the harmful economic edifice that has been built upon the radical responsibilization 
of the workforce. I argue this in the name of social equality. But it could also be defended in 
terms of innovation, productivity and a truly functioning knowledge economy.  
In conclusion, human capital theory is just one manifestation of a set of 
comprehensive neoclassical economic ideas that accentuate self-interested individualism as 
the only way to envisage the organization of work. However, when set upon the backdrop of 
wider socio-economic inequalities and uneven power relationships, this excessive 
individualism recasts workers as complete owners of their economic failure. Governments 
too have followed this policy in relation to training and education. As a result, it is misleading 
to say that human capital theory is about investing in people. It may also represent a form of 
divestment. The advocates of Uberization claim it is the future, no matter what. How 
employees, organizations and scholars respond to this proclamation will shape the politics of 
work to come.         
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